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Administrative Judges' Role in Developing Social 
Policy 
Charles Koch, Jr. • 
Administrative judges have a serious, in some sense 
dysfunctional, inferiority complex.1 This leads them to be hyper-
sensitive regarding their status vis-a-vis "real" judges. Yet their 
role in society may eclipse that of other judges. While their worth 
is often measured by cost effectiveness, their most significant 
contribution is in the evolution of social policy.2 Indeed, given the 
growth of the administrative state, they have become crucial to 
policy development. As the great sage of the administrative 
process, James Landis, observed: "The ultimate test of the 
administrative [institution] is the policy that it formulates; not the 
fairness as between the parties of the disposition of a controversy 
on a record of their own making. "3 
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1. Officials who preside over administrative hearings are given many 
names. Practice has settled on "administrative law judge," almost always 
"ALJ." An acronym, although perhaps instinctive for administrative systems, 
demeans them. Thus I use the general term "administrative judge." It 
emphasizes that they are, no matter the label, judges and no less so because they 
usually preside over specially tailored hearings. Certainly they are every bit as 
much judges as family or traffic court judges. Their constitutional status is 
equal to that ofbankruptcy or immigration judges. 
2. The term "policy" encompasses a wide variety of decisions that advance 
or protect some collective goal of the community as a whole (as opposed to 
those decisions that respect or secure some individual or group right). See 1 
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE§ 1.2[2](d) (2d ed. 
1997); HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 141 (William Eskridge & Philip 
Frickey eds., 1994) ("A policy is simply a statement of objectives."); Ronald 
Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1975), reprinted in 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 4 ( 1977). 
3. JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 39 (1938). 
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It is well established that administrative agencies, like common 
law courts, may evolve policy through adjudication.4 Despite this 
well-established and longstanding doctrine, little is understood 
about the mechanics of such adjudicative policy-making. Thus, the 
central role of the administrative judges to this crucial administrative 
function remains largely unexamined, even by the judges 
themselves. This Article isolates the role of administrative judges 
in the development of administrative policy. It concludes that they 
must have a substantial role if policy-making in administrative 
adjudication is to perform the key task of administrative policy-
making in general. 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. makes it clear that agencies as well as the courts must obey 
congressional intent to the extent they can find it in the statute.6 
Administrative judges are just as responsible as the agencies for 
compliance with this command. In doing so, they must follow the 
lead of the agencies for reasons beyond authority, including 
uniformity, accountability, and fairness. Like the agency, 
administrative judges may shift to policy-making only if 
application of the statute in the individual case is impossible 
without some policy-making. 7 Related to their role in policy-
4. While often affirmed, the leading cases.are NLRB 'v. Bell Aerospace Co., 
416 U.S. 267 (1974) and NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
William D. Araiza, Agency Adjudication, the Importance of Facts, and the 
Limitations of Labels, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 (2000). See generally 
KOCH, supra note 2, § 2.12. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Chenery II 
established administrative discretion to choose between rulemaking or 
adjudication. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947) 
("The absence of a general rule or regulation governing management trading 
during reorganization did not affect the Commission's duties in relation to the 
particular proposal before it."). 
5. This article focuses on the administrative judge's role in the larger 
context discussed in Charles J. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative 
Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REv. 693 (2005). 
6. 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
7. It is necessary to distinguish administrative policy-making from 
statutory interpretation. This distinction is crucial to the authority of federal 
courts and hence it has been well expressed in that context. The Supreme Court 
recently observed: "[W]hile there are federal interests that occasionally justify 
this Court's development of federal common-law, our normal role is to interpret 
law created by others and 'not to prescribe what it shall be.'" Danforth v. 
Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1046 (2008) (quoting Am. Trucking Assns., Inc. v. 
Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). 
Field, for example, observed that '"federal common law' ... refer[s] to any rule 
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making, an administrative judge may find occasion to question the 
agency's interpretation and begin the process of reevaluation up 
the adjudicative hierarchy. Nonetheless, the administrative policy-
making function is categorically different from statutory 
interpretation, and the role of the administrative judge is also 
different. 8 
Administrative policy is fluid, and adjudication has a well-
accepted role to play in its development.9 However, administrative 
judges, like that of their judicial counterparts, must stay within the 
limits of the adjudicative process. The notion of stability serves 
the individual values of predictability and reli~ce. 10 These 
of federal law created by a court . . . when the substance of that rule is not 
clearly suggested by federal enactments--constitutional or congressional." 
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REv. 881, 890 (1986) (emphasis omitted). Merrill expressed the 
necessary contrast between law making and interpretation. Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 5 (1985) 
('"Federal common law' ... means any federal rule of qecision that is not 
mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text-whether or not that 
rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either a conventional 
or an unconventional sense."). 
8. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 ("When a challenge to an agency 
construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the 
wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice 
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, 
federal judges--who have no constituenc~ave a duty to respect legitimate 
policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the 
wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing 
views of the public interest are not judicial ones: 'Our Constitution vests such 
responsibilities in the political branches."'). 
9. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in 
Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 91 
(1991) ("These sources of indeterminacy in dealing with precedents have the 
effect of enabling the Justices to engage in conscientious disagreements over the 
scope of precedents, to consider new or renewed arguments, and to contribute to 
the evolution of constitutional doctrine."). 
10. Predictability and stability are integral to assuring the rule of law. 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18-21 (1997). See Lon Fuller, The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 357 (1978) ("[A]djudication 
should be viewed as a form of social ordering, as a way in which the relations of 
men to one another are governed and regulated. Even in the absence of any 
formalized doctrine of stare decisis or res judicata, an adjudicative determination 
will normally enter in some degree into the litigants' future relations and into the 
future relations of other parties who see themselves as possible litigants before 
the same tribunal."). 
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considerations are no doubt important to a fair administrative 
system. Citizens should be able to rely on a current understanding 
of agency law and take action under some reliable prediction of 
administrative reaction. Administration should seek consistency 
over time and within a program. 11 On the other hand, each new 
precedent potentially impacts policy options. Fortunately, stare 
decisis is not the rule in administrative adjudications, so an agency 
is permitted to change its policy. 12 Thus, adjudicative policy-
making must balance stability and innovation. 
The "agency," as an institution, is responsible for developing 
and adjusting its policy. Administrative adjudicative systems, even 
relatively informal ones, replicate the basic judicial hierarchy. The 
norm is a hearing reviewed through at least one level of 
administrative appeal, often to the agency itself. In the end, the 
agency must adopt a policy position in order for that policy to have 
weight, giving the administrative review authority, either the 
agency head or its representative, has the power to speak for the 
institution as a whole. Thus, the hierarchical system centralizes 
11. The doctrine of precedent in general furthers both temporal stability and 
equality: 
This concern for equal treatment usually surfaces in discussions about 
the temporal stability of legal rules, because stare decisis promotes the 
equal treatment of individuals over time. But equal treatment in a 
spatial sense seems an equally compelling goal .... [G]eographical 
variation in otherwise uniform rules caused by divergent judicial 
interpretations seems irrational and unfair. 
Evan Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 
46 STAN. L. REv. 817, 852 (1994). Geographic or intra-program variation 
would seem particularly repugnant in most administrative schemes. See 
generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 677, 735-36 (1989). 
12. See Entergy Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 319 F.3d 
536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) ("An agency's interpretation of its own precedent is entitled to 
deference .... ")); State of Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556-57 
(5th Cir. 1989) ("An agency ... is not bound by the shackles of stare decisis to 
follow blindly the interpretations that it, or the courts of appeals, have adopted 
in the past."). But see Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd., 342 F.3d 
222, 229 (3d Cir. 2003) ("If an agency departs from its own precedent without a 
reasoned explanation, the agency may be said to have acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously."); Ramaprakash v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 346 F.3d 1121, 1124 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[A]gency action is arbitrary and capricious if it departs from 
agency precedent without explanation."); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 315 F.3d 316, 323 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (''Normally, an 
agency must adhere to its precedents in adjudicating cases before it."). 
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adjudicative policy-making authority in a superior review 
authority. 13 Yet, the interaction between the administrative judges 
and the review authority determines the success of adjudicative 
policy-making. The review stage serves the dual function of 
holding the administrative judges responsible outside their hearing 
room and allowing for open analysis of possible policy-making 
initiatives. 14 The administrative judges, for their part, serve the 
overall process by bringing policy alternatives to the agency's 
attention and forcing the agency to justify aggregate objectives as 
against practical reality and individual consequences. 
In addition, administrative judges have the foundational role of 
developing the policy-making record. Policy confronted in 
adjudication requires that the facts compiled in the hearing level 
record be adequate to support policy determinations and the 
justification for those decisions. The record provides the policy 
analysis throughout the adjudicative machinery with the 
information it needs. In the end, the administrative judges must 
produce a record adequate for that purpose. 
Fortunately, administrative law permits its adjudicators to be 
active in the development of the record. 15 It is one of the ways 
administrative adjudication is superior to other forms, especially in 
confronting policy issues. Administrative judges must ensure that 
the record contains the necessary technical and other policy 
oriented information, what administrative law defines as 
"legislative facts." 16 In addition, the administrative judge might 
13. While administrative judges should share knowledge and experience in 
handling individual cases, they should not feel in any way bound by their 
colleagues' prior treatment oflike cases. 
14. "In very broad terms, if the head of the agency remains relatively free to 
reverse the ALJ, the values of expertise and political accountability 
predominate. If the head of the agency is bound to defer substantially to the 
ALJ, the value of objectivity and its appearance are dominant." William R. 
Anderson, Judicial Review of State Administrative Action: Designing the 
Statutory Framework, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 523, 556 (1992). 
15. See, e.g., Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995) ("ALJs 
have a duty to develop a full and fair record in social security cases."); 
Yanopoulos v. Dept. ofNavy, 796 F.2d 468,471 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
16. "Legislative facts" are contrasted with "adjudicative facts," or the facts 
necessary to resolve the relevant individual dispute. Kenneth Davis, An 
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. 
REv. 364, 402 (1942) ("When an agency wrestles with a question of law or 
policy, it is acting legislatively .... [T]he facts which inform [the tribunal's] 
legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts," 
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consider whether broader opinions beyond those provided by the 
litigants are necessary for a full airing of the policy issue. 
Administrative judges have considerable discretion to admit such a 
range of evidence, but they also need independent authority to seek 
additional information, particularly legislative facts or policy-
oriented comments from non-litigants. 17 While party control ofthe 
record is sufficient for individual dispute resolution, the policy-
making function of adjudication is greatly enhanced when an 
administrative judge ensures an adequate policy-making record in 
those limited cases where the judge determines that the agency 
may need to develop its policy in deciding an individual dispute. 
The agency is also the locus of the general policy-making 
process: "rulemaking." Ostensibly, administrative judges are not 
included in that process; yet, they have a role. It is well-
established that agencies have broad authority to interpret their 
own rules and policy pronouncements and even to engage in 
justified deviation. 18 Since the agency has the authority to 
whereas adjudicative facts are "facts concerning [the] immediate parties."). The 
distinction is also important to the rules regarding judicial notice. FED. R. EVID. 
201, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1930 (1975). 
17. Under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, judges may seek legal 
advice only. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3(b) (2008). See also 
JEFFREY SHAMAN, STEVEN LUBET & JAMES J. ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND 
ETHICS 173 (2000) ("While judges may, under certain circumstances, obtain 
expert advice concerning the law from disinterested legal experts, the exception 
does not extend to experts in other areas."). The Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct intentionally narrows access to "legal" experts, which, as discussed 
below, might be valuable in making policy judgments if read generously. 
Consultation with other types of experts is prohibited for members of the 
judiciary, but administrative law might take a different view. /d. § 5.07. 
18. The classic authority for this proposition is Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945) ("Since this involves an interpretation of 
an administrative regulation a court must necessarily look to the administrative 
construction of the regulation if the meaning of the words used is in doubt."), 
but the most cited case is Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (dealing with 
agency interpretations in general). The Supreme Court continually reafftrms 
this longstanding approach. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 
576, 588 (2000) ("[A]n agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled 
to deference."); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comrn'n, 499 
U.S. 144, 151 (1991) ("Because applying an agency's regulation to complex or 
changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and 
policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to 
interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency's delegated 
lawmaking powers."). 
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interpret its general policy pronouncements, its administrative 
judges in the course of applying the policy statements will identify 
instances in which interpretation is necessary. 19 Thus, as with 
superior precedent, administrative judges miFt interpret rules so 
as to move the agency's policy along.2 Moreover, their 
applications of general policy to individual disputes provide 
perspective on the policy as applied so that the agency has 
"samples" for evolving future policy. 
Change should percolate up through the process, and judges' 
interpretations provide experience upon which the rule and its 
policy are to develop. Adjustments within the terms of the rule 
neither challenge the agency's authority nor unduly upset stability 
and equality. While judges must pay close attention to the 
language and clear meaning, a potential policy-making 
contribution, as with precedent, requires them to look behind the 
rule to conclude that strict application of the terms of the rule 
would not further its purpose in the case at hand. That is, rather 
than literal strategies of interpretation, the judge may attempt to 
apply the rule as the agency should interpret it in that context and 
hence launch a policy inquiry throughout the administrative 
hierarchy. 
The melding of rules and other policy pronouncements into 
individual adjudicative decisions raises complex questions about 
the allocation of authority within the administrative structure. That 
administrative rules have different force and may bind 
administrative adjudicators in various ways might be seen as 
complicating the division of authority. Rules made pursuant to 
delegated authority to make policy-"legislative rules"-have the 
force of law binding both the agency, including of course the 
19. Interpretation may not constitute amendment or repeal. So even the 
agency head may not amend or repeal in an adjudication, because a rule must be 
amended or repealed by the same procedure with which it was promulgated. 
KOCH, supra note 2, § 4.60[2]. If the need for amendment is identified in 
adjudication or if the interpretation cannot make the necessary adjustment 
without constituting an amendment, then the adjudicators must commend the 
issue to the policy-making processes of the agency. 
20. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 96 (1995) ("The APA 
does not require that all the specific applications of a rule evolve by further, 
more precise rules rather than by adjudication .... "). 
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administrative judges, and courts.21 However, the vast majority of 
an agency's general policy is announced in other forms and under 
various labels: generally "guidance documents." The practical 
value of these guidance documents is to allow the a£ency to 
efficiently and expeditiously disclose its policy thinking. 2 While 
guidance documents are said to have only "persuasive" effect, they 
nonetheless generally bind the agency and hence all agency 
adjudicators. 
From a system perspective, comprehensive adherence assures 
equal treatment. In terms of fairness, individuals should be able to 
rely on these guidance documents. 23 In short, administrative 
judges have the dual role of applying general agency policy and 
assuring individual fairness in its application.24 Nonetheless, in 
certain circumstances, this role may demand that the administrative 
judges raise policy questions that the agency should confront. 
In sum, administrative judges are no less than the cornerstone 
of the administrative adjudicative aspect of policy-making. 
Administrative judges serve the policy-making function as both 
record builders and initial decision-makers. All other participants 
in the adjudicative process, including the courts, work from this 
initial policy analysis. The agency must develop policy that carries 
forward the intent of the statute, and administrative judges should 
21. E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843-44 (1984) ("Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."); 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979); O'Sullivan v. Countrywide 
Home Loan, Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 741 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
844 ("Where . . . agency regulations are promulgated under express 
congressional authority, they are given controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.")). 
22. E.g., Robert Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, 
Manuals, and the Like-should Federal Agencies Use them to Bind the Public?, 
41 DUKE L. J. 1311, 1317 (1992) ("The use of nonlegislative policy documents 
generally serves the important function of informing staff and the public about 
agency positions, and in the great majority of instances is proper and indeed 
very valuable."). Nonetheless, the Office of Management and Budget recently 
published guidelines to encourage agencies to provide some participation for 
guidance documents. Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 
Fed. Reg. 3432-01 (Jan. 25, 2007). 
23. Anthony, supra note 22, at 1323. 
24. The Supreme Court has ruled that the agency should not apply such 
policy where the result would be unfair. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 233-35 
(1974). 
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contribute to that policy development. This paper urges that they 
embrace this role and think carefully about how they should 
perform it. 
The very theory of our government, however, counsels caution 
and restraint. Administrative judges are one level further removed 
from the democratic institutions than are the agencies they serve. 
The regulatory and beneficial programs for which the 
administrative state was created require delegations, and 
practicality has supported very broad delegations. For example, 
Justice Blackmun found in Mistretta v. United States: "Applying 
this 'intelligible principle' test to congressional delegations, our 
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in 
our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and 
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent 
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives."25 
Democratic accountability is permissibly removed one level 
through monitoring the implementing authority. Posner and 
Vermeule observed: 
Accountability is not lost through delegation, then; it is 
transformed. Congress is accountable for the performance 
of agencies generally, and people properly evaluate the 
agencies' accomplishments as well as failures when 
deciding whether to hold members responsible for 
authorizing the agency, or for failing to curtail its power, 
fix its mistakes, or eliminate it altogether.26 
Administrative judges, however, are another level removed and 
suffer from many of the same process impediments present in all 
judicial policy-making. In the end, democracy demands that the 
final policy judgments be made by the agency as intended by the 
legislature and monitored by the courts. Argued here is that 
administrative judges, nonetheless, should be important 
participants in that process, but they must be no more than that. 
The specter of personal prejudices also counsels hesitation. 
Recognizing a policy-making role does not give administrative 
judges license. As they leave the realm of individual dispute 
25. 488 u.s. 361,372 (1989). 
26. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeu1e, Interring the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1749 (2002). 
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resolution and join the policy-making process, they must carefully 
consider the sources of their personal policy preferences. A good 
deal of theoretical and behavioral work has been done on judicial 
decision-making, and administrative judges should examine that.27 
Administrative judges must be conscious of their motivations and 
assure that they are appropriate.28 Lynn Stout, however, offers 
reason for optimism that should guide both the administrative 
judges and the agencies who employ them: "Judges understand, at 
an intuitive level, that the judicial role is premised on society's 
expectation that judges, when they are judging, will adopt an other-
regarding preference function rather than a self-interest preference 
function; that they will seek not to improve their own welfare but 
to 'do the right thing. "'29 
27. Of the numerous theoretical and empirical efforts to explain how judges 
make policy choices, I fmd most useful Dworkin, supra note 2. 
28. See Koch, supra note 5, at 720-26, for further explanation. 
29. Lynn Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
1605, 1625 (2002). For those of us who think about managing administrative 
judges, she observes: "If the judiciary is indeed an institution built on the 
expectation and experience of judicial altruism, even in its diluted form of 
commitment to public service, understanding the determinants of altruistic 
behavior may well be the key to encouraging good judging." Id at 1619. 
